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A B S T R A C T
Critical infrastructure is a system that consists of civil infrastructures in which disruption or failure would have a
serious impact on the lives and health of the population. It includes, for example, electricity, oil and gas, water
supplies, communications and emergency or healthcare services. It is therefore important that technical resi-
lience and organisational resilience is provided continuously and at a high level by the owners and operators of
these civil infrastructures. Organisational resilience management mainly consists of continuously assessing de-
terminants in order to identify weak points early so that adequate security measures can be taken to strengthen
them. In the context of the above, the article presents a method for Assessing and Strengthening Organisational
Resilience (ASOR Method) in a critical infrastructure system. The essence of this method lies in deﬁning the
factors that determine organisational resilience and the process of assessing and strengthening organisational
resilience. The method thus allows weaknesses to be identiﬁed and the subsequent quantiﬁcation of positive
impacts that strengthen individual factors in organisational resilience. A beneﬁt from applying this method is
minimizing the risk and subsequent adverse impact on society of critical infrastructure system disruption or
failure. The article also contributes to achieving the UN Sustainable Development Goal 9, namely Building
Resilient Infrastructure. The ASOR method namely contributes to the development of quality, reliable, sus-
tainable and resilient infrastructure, including regional and trans-border infrastructure. Finally, the article
presents the results of this method’s practical application on a selected electricity critical infrastructure entity in
the Slovak Republic.
1. Introduction
A critical infrastructure (CI) means an asset, system or part thereof,
which is essential for the maintenance of vital societal functions, health,
safety, security, economic or social well-being of people, and the dis-
ruption or destruction of which would have a signiﬁcant impact as a
result of the failure to maintain those functions (European Council,
2008). An important factor of risk management and critical infra-
structure protection is continually strengthening its resilience (Public
Safety Canada, 2018; Labaka et al., 2015).
In a critical infrastructure system, resilience is understood as a si-
tuation that reduces its vulnerability, minimises the consequences of
active threats, accelerates response and recovery and facilitates adap-
tation to a given disruptive event (NIAC, 2009). The resilience cycle in a
critical infrastructure system (Fig. 1) thus enables cyclic restoration and
continuous strengthening of the critical infrastructure element’s resi-
lience through prevention, absorption, recovery and adaptation. In this
regard, resilience management is an important factor of risk manage-
ment in a critical infrastructure (ISO, 2018).
The reference point for high-quality and eﬀective resilience man-
agement is the ability to assess it for the purpose of identifying weak-
nesses. Resilience in the critical infrastructure system should be as-
sessed at two levels. The ﬁrst level consists of critical infrastructure
elements,1 where ‘technical resilience’ is assessed (Rehak et al., 2018).
The second level consists of critical infrastructure entities,2 where ‘or-
ganisational resilience’ is assessed (ASIS, 2009; Denyer, 2017).
Organisational resilience is deﬁned as the ability of an organisation
to absorb and adapt in a changing environment (ISO, 2017) and/or to
survive and strengthen in times of crisis (Seville et al., 2008; Gonçalves
et al., 2019). In the context of critical infrastructure it may be perceived
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as a management process leading to the increased adaptability of cri-
tical infrastructure elements to the recurring impact of past, disruptive
events. Organisational resilience should be managed collectively for all
the critical infrastructure elements operated by a given organisation.
This type of resilience should be shaped, assessed and strengthened by
the organisation’s management in the prevention phase.
Several specialized publications concerning the assessment of resi-
lience in a critical infrastructure system are currently available (e.g.,
Nan and Sansavini, 2017; Labaka et al., 2015; Petit et al., 2013), but the
methods discussed focus on assessing the technical resilience of ele-
ments while only touching on or not looking at organisational resilience
at all. Another group of approaches studies the assessment of organi-
sational resilience (e.g., Bertocchi et al., 2016; Prior, 2015; ASIS, 2009),
but only qualitatively, which does not allow the positive impacts of
strengthening individual factors of organisational resilience to be
quantiﬁed. Based on the foregoing, the aim of this article is to create a
method of assessing and strengthening organisational resilience in a
critical infrastructure system.
2. Factors determining organisational resilience
The starting point for assessing organisational resilience in a critical
infrastructure system is setting the factors that determine this type of
resilience (see Fig. 2). It is important to note that these factors should be
deﬁned in the context of the purpose that the results of organisational
resilience assessment will serve, i.e. to increase the adaptability of
critical infrastructure elements to disruptive events that have occurred
in the past. Hence, these factors should reﬂect an entity’s preparedness
to risks, the environment’s preparedness in deﬁning and implementing
adaptation processes, and the preparedness of personnel in increasing
the adaptability of critical infrastructure elements. To this end, these
factors should be categorized into three basic processes that include
managing risk, innovation and employee (e.g., Kalowski, 2015; Boylan
and Turner, 2017; NIAC, 2009; McManus et al., 2008).
Risk management is an important internal organisational process
essential to ensuring safety and strengthening resilience already in the
prevention stage. Risk management means coordinating the activities of
leadership and organising management with regard to risks (ISO,
2018). In relation to risk management of organisational resilience, their
level is determined by four factors, namely the level of risk manage-
ment, the level of risk assessment methods applied, the level of safety
standards implemented, and the level of speciﬁcation of the disruptive
event scenarios, which are the key starting points for creating con-
tingency plans.
Other internal processes that signiﬁcantly contribute to strength-
ening the resilience of critical infrastructure elements in the prevention
stage is an organisational innovation processes. These can be separated
from a practical point of view into product, process, marketing and
organisational innovations (OECD/Eurostat, 2005). Process and orga-
nisational innovations are particularly important for strengthening re-
silience in terms of adaptability and focus on the reliability and external
security of the technologies used. From this point of view, the level of
the innovation process can be described by eight basic factors (Fig. 2).
Educational and development processes are the last group of pro-
cesses that shape and strengthen the organisational resilience of critical
infrastructure elements. The educational and development processes
can be categorized into three basic types (Armstrong, 2014): knowledge
(explicit and tacit), skills (e.g. technical, managerial, analytical, con-
ceptual), and attitudes (reﬂecting the values a particular person re-
cognizes). The key forms of educational and development activities
include long-term education, study abroad, soft skills development,
professional (of preventive and repressive nature) and employee
training. Factors determining the level of education and development
processes are shown in Fig. 2.
A principle of these factors is analysing an organisation’s pre-
paredness in increasing the adaptability of critical infrastructure to the
recurring impact of past, disruptive events. For this reason, the factors
focus on risk management processes (which preventatively and oper-
ationally minimise risks and their impact on CI elements), innovation
Fig. 1. Resilience cycle in a critical infrastructure system (Rehak et al., 2019).
Fig. 2. Factors determining organisational resilience.
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processes (which increase the technical resilience of CI elements), and
processes for educating and developing personnel (which increase
awareness of safety in CI elements, thereby minimising personal risks).
Besides these processes, attention could also be given to planning, im-
plementation and inspection processes (ASIS, 2009). These, however,
do not correspond directly with resilience in critical infrastructure
elements. For this reason, we may conclude that these factors are suf-
ﬁcient for assessing the organisational resilience of critical infra-
structure.
Subsequently, the author deﬁned individual factors, which included
a description and setting the assessment parameters to indicate level
with a score ranging between 1 and 100 points (the value 1 represents
the minimum level of positive impact of the parameter on the creation
of resilience and the value 100 represents the maximum positive im-
pact). These scores were categorized into ﬁve levels. The score is based
on the principle of linear ascension, where the diﬀerence between ca-
tegories is directly proportional.
Deﬁning the factors was primarily based on analysing the relevant
documents above (i.e., ISO, 2018; OECD/Eurostat, 2005; Armstrong,
2014; McManus et al., 2008) and implemented by co-operating with
experts from selected energy and transport critical infrastructure enti-
ties. Speciﬁcally, these were security directors and crisis managers of
ČEPS (Czech Transmission System), SŽDC (Czech Railway Infra-
structure Administration) and ŘSD (Road and Motorway Directorate),
and the Security Liaison Oﬃcers of the ministries concerned, i.e. the
Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic, the Ministry of Industry
and Trade of the Czech Republic and the Ministry of Transport of the
Czech Republic. Stakeholders’ analysis was conducted using A Guide to
Stakeholder Identiﬁcation and Analysis Techniques (Bryson, 2004). An
example of deﬁning a factor at the level of risk management is pre-
sented in Table 1.
The ﬁnal step in deﬁning the factors that determine organisational
resilience was to establish the weighting coeﬃcients that take into ac-
count their diﬀerent levels of signiﬁcance (Table 2). To establish the
weighting coeﬃcients, simple methods can be used. For example, the
Point Allocation Method, Weighted Ranking Method, Basic Variant
Method or Fuller Triangle Method. More complex methods based on
pairwise comparisons of variants can also be applied. For example, the
Analytic Hierarchy Process – AHP (Saaty, 2008) or Analytic Network
Process – ANP (Saaty, 2004). Methods based on utility function quan-
tiﬁcation or combinations of them are also useful (Weil and
Apostolakis, 2001). In certain cases, the application of fuzzy logic
(Djapan et al., 2013) may be an advantage.
Determining the weighting coeﬃcients and subsequently standar-
dizing them was conducted under an expert assessment of the expected
future users of the method (i.e. the above-mentioned entities) using the
Analytic Hierarchy Process method (Saaty, 2008), which is based on a
pairwise comparison of variants supporting the assessment of criteria
hierarchies. This method speciﬁcally allows realistic weight estimates
to be set. It is therefore often applied in practice and achieves good
results (De La Canal and Ferraris, 2013). One advantage of the AHP
method is the support for preferential evaluation, which allows
involved parties to assess resilience subjectively according to their
preferred weights (Rehak and Senovsky, 2014).
The advantage of the AHP method is in supporting preferential
evaluation that allows interested parties to carry out a subjective as-
sessment of resilience based on preferred weights (Rehak and Senovsky,
2014). By their very nature, expert evaluations and the weights derived
from them will always be subjective to some extent. Given that there is
still intense research in this area, there is no widely accepted hierarchy
of items, therefore the evaluation must be to some extent subjective.
However, the use of such methods in management is not uncommon
(Grabinski, 2007). The weighting coeﬃcient speciﬁcation allows this
subjectivity to be transparently collected in one place and acknowl-
edged. If required, the weighting system can be revised in the future.
3. Method for assessing and strengthening organisational
resilience
The ASOR method was created by the author for the needs of
Assessing and Strengthening Organisational Resilience in critical in-
frastructure system. The principle of this method lies in assessing fac-
tors that determine organisational resilience, identifying weak points
and proposing measures for strengthening organisational resilience in a
critical infrastructure entity. This method is mainly intended for se-
curity managers at critical infrastructure entities, but some aspects of
the method are suitable for other managerial positions (e.g., personnel
managers or innovation managers).
The fundamental part of the ASOR is its framework (Fig. 3), which
deﬁnes the inputs necessary to achieve the assessment process itself.
The use of the aforementioned factors is conditional on good knowledge
of the critical infrastructure entity, deﬁning a disruptive event scenario
against which resilience can be assessed, and knowledge of the pro-
cesses suitable for strengthening organisational resilience.
The central part of this method is the process of assessing and
strengthening organisational resilience in a critical infrastructure
system. This procedure is based on the available resources, focusing
especially on critical infrastructure resilience factors (Bertocchi et al.,
2016; Rehak et al., 2018), organisational resilience factors (ISO, 2017;
ASIS, 2009), critical infrastructure resilience indicators (Prior, 2015;
Petit et al., 2013; Rehak et al., 2017) and processes enhancing critical
infrastructure resilience (Public Safety Canada, 2018; Labaka et al.,
2015). From these documents, six steps were deﬁned that allowed the
level of organisational resilience to be assessed, weak points to be
identiﬁed, and measures for strengthening organisational resilience to
be proposed (Fig. 4).
Step 1: Analysing the selected critical infrastructure entity
The initial step in assessing and strengthening organisational resi-
lience is to analyse a selected critical infrastructure entity. The analysis
should focus on risk management, organisational innovation processes
and educational and development processes. Attention should be given
to individual factors under which these processes are determined within
Table 1
Deﬁning the “Level of Risk Management” factor.
Factor Description Assessment parameters and their scores
The aim is to assess the level of coordinated activity to manage and monitor the organisation with respect
to risk. Particular attention is given to the level of implementation and execution of risk management
strategies, risk analysis, risk management, risk monitoring and risk management optimization.
81–100: A risk management system is in place at the organisation. It
is regularly optimized and includes strategies.
61–80: A risk management system is in place at the organisation. It is
regularly optimized but lacks strategies.
41–60: A risk management system is in place at the organisation. It is
not regularly optimized.
21–40: Risks are monitored at the organisation, but no risk
management system is in place.
1–20: Risks are not assessed at the organisation.
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the context of their usability in order to increase the adaptability of
critical infrastructure elements to the repeated eﬀects of past disruptive
events.
Step 2: Deﬁning the disruptive event scenario
Not only the technical resilience of the elements but also the orga-
nisational resilience of the critical infrastructure entity needs to be as-
sessed in the context of a particular disruptive event. This is because
some factors (notably the Disruptive Event Scenario Speciﬁcation Level
and the Security Innovation Measures Level) can only be set in the
context of certain threats. For this reason, it is important to deﬁne a
disruptive event scenario before assessment. Speciﬁc methods such as
Event Tree Analysis (IEC, 2010) or Failure Tree Analysis (IEC 61025,
2006b) can be applied in this area.
Step 3: Determining the level of organisational resilience
The key step in the process described is to calculate the level of
organisational resilience. For this purpose, a semi-quantitative ap-
proach of assessment was selected. This approach is based on the ex-
pression as a percentage of individual factors determining organisa-
tional resilience. These expressions already include comparative values
and are suitable for further use, i.e. to identify weak points. The cal-
culation of organisational resilience itself is based on an easy to follow
principle of linear aggregation of weighted values (Nasibova and
Nasibov, 2010), whose results are relatively easy to interpret (Eq. (1)).
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where OR = organisational resilience of the critical infrastructure en-
tity [%]; Pi = the i-th process of organisational resilience [%], wi = the
i-th normalized weight of the i-th process of organisational resilience
[〈0;1〉], n = total number of processes determining organisational re-
silience; Fj = the j-th factor of organisational resilience [〈1;100〉],
vj = the j-th normalized weight of the j-th organisational resilience
factor [〈0;1〉]; and m = total number of factors in the i-th organisa-
tional resilience process. The potential level of organisational resilience
of a critical infrastructure entity is presented in graphical form in Fig. 5.
When using the principle of linear aggregation of weighted values, it
is necessary to take into account that this calculation method may be
encumbered by some problems. Especially signiﬁcant is the implicit
possibility of substitution, that is, the possibility of compensating for
the lower value of one variable by the higher value of the second
variable. This is a problem especially if the result is to be compared, for
example, to diﬀerent critical infrastructure entities. Another possible
problem may be in the attempt of an evaluator to “deceive” the system.
This choice is technically possible, but it is practically meaningless,
because nothing forces the critical infrastructure entity to use this
evaluation system. It is an informative tool providing information of a
preventive nature in order to strengthen organisational resilience
against selected disruptive events.
Step 4: Assessing the level of organisational resilience
The ﬁnal step in assessing organisational resilience is assessment of
Table 2
Standardized weights of processes and factors determining organisational resilience.
Weights of the organisational resilience processes (w) Weights of the organisational resilience factors (v)
Risk management (0,4) Level of risk management (0,4)
Level of risk assessment methods applied (0,2)
Level of safety standards implemented (0,1)
Level of speciﬁcation of disruptive event scenarios (0,3)
Organisational innovation processes (0,3) Flexibility of the organisational structure (0,1)
Level of management systems implemented (0,1)
Methods of organisational process management (0,1)
Level of innovation in management processes (0,1)
Scope of technological innovations implemented (0,2)
Level of innovation in security measures (0,2)
Level of the organisation’s involvement in science and research (0,1)
Level of the organisation’s investment into speciﬁc innovations (0,1)
Educational and development processes (0,3) Level of education provided or supported to the organisation’s employees (0,4)
Level of employee training and maintenance of practical skills (0,4)
Method of evaluating the eﬀectiveness of employee training (0,2)
Fig. 3. Framework for the method of assessing and strengthening organisational resilience in a critical infrastructure system.
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the achieved level and the adoption of adequate conclusions. To this
end, an acceptance grading scale was created, which includes ﬁve ca-
tegories analogous to the cases that deﬁne factors. The methodology for
determining organisational resilience acceptability levels is based on
the Failure Mode, Eﬀects and Criticality Analysis method (IEC, 2006a),
which uses multiple variables to determine the level of risk and is based
on variations in their extreme values when assessing states. Individual
levels of resilience were determined similarly, taking into account
variations in extreme values in the number of classiﬁcation categories
(Table 3).
The above scale of acceptability levels shows that if organisational
resilience reaches 69% or more (i.e. acceptable or high level), there is
no need to take fundamental steps towards strengthening it.
Conversely, if organisational resilience reaches a level of 68% or less
(i.e. low, insuﬃcient or critical), it is necessary to identify weaknesses
(see step 5), which consists in decomposing the assessment results at the
level of individual factors.
Step 5: Identifying weak points
Identifying weaknesses lies in decomposing the results of individual
factors. Factors that have a resilience level of 68% or less (i.e. factors
that do not reach the minimum acceptable level), need to be reviewed
and a setup or recovery process should be initiated (see step 6).
Fig. 4. The process of assessing and strengthening organisational resilience in a critical infrastructure system.
Fig. 5. Example of expressing the level of organisational resilience of a critical infrastructure entity.
Table 3
Determination of the acceptance grading scale of organisational resilience.
Verbal expression of
level
Calculation of levels by
FMECA
Numeric expression of
level
Critical level 1,1,1,1,5 => ∅ 1.8 0–36%
Insuﬃcient level 1,1,1,5,5 => ∅ 2.6 37–52%
Low level 1,1,5,5,5 => ∅ 3.4 53–68%
Acceptable level 1,5,5,5,5 => ∅ 4.2 69–84%
High level 5,5,5,5,5 => ∅ 5.0 85–100%
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Step 6: Designing measures to strengthen organisational resilience
Based on decomposition of the assessment’s results, measures to
strengthen organisational resilience can be proposed. Strengthening
resilience should be done as follows:
- Low level of resilience (53–68%): factors in this category embody
suﬃcient parameters but improving them would signiﬁcantly en-
hance the organisational resilience of the critical infrastructure en-
tity.
- Insuﬃcient level of resilience (37–52%): factors found in this cate-
gory exhibit very poor parameters that signiﬁcantly reduce the re-
silience of the aﬀected processes.
- Critical level of resilience (0–36%): factors in this category are ei-
ther completely absent or show critically low parameters. These
factors need to be completely revised and their recovery process
started as soon as possible.
To this end, not only applying the standard principles and re-
quirements for strengthening organisational resilience (e.g., ISO, 2017;
ASIS, 2009; Tasic et al., 2019) but also the speciﬁc requirements related
to strengthening critical infrastructure is appropriate. In these circum-
stances, two initial documents can be recommended, namely the Na-
tional Cross Sector Forum 2018–2020 Action Plan for Critical Infra-
structure (Public Safety Canada, 2018) and A Framework to Improve the
Resilience of Critical Infrastructures (Labaka et al., 2015).
The 2018–2020 Action Plan (Public Safety Canada, 2018) continues
to support the three strategic objectives identiﬁed in the national
strategy for enhancing resilience in the critical infrastructure in Canada,
i.e. building partnerships, sharing and protecting information and im-
plementing an all-hazards risk management approach. A framework
(Labaka et al., 2015) deﬁnes eight policies for improving organisational
resilience: CI Organisational Procedures for Crisis Management; CI Top
Management Commitment; CI Crisis Manager Preparation; CI Operator
Preparation; First Responder Preparation; Government Preparation;
Trusted Network Community; and Crisis Regulation and Legislation.
4. Example of the ASOR method’s practical application in a
selected electricity critical infrastructure entity
The ASOR method has been successfully applied by some critical
infrastructure entities in the Czech Republic and Slovak Republic,
among the most signiﬁcant being, for example, the Czech Transmission
System Operator, Czech Railway Infrastructure Administration,
Regional Hospital Ostrava, Central Slovak Power Distribution Company
and Railways of Slovak Republic. The presentation below of the ASOR
method’s practical application and obtained results have been anon-
ymised to protect the critical infrastructure entity concerned.
A critical infrastructure entity was selected from the energy sector in
order to assess its organisational resilience and strength (step 1). The
selected entity is a company operating in the territory of three regions
of the Slovak Republic, distributing electricity nearly to 740,000 cus-
tomers (i.e. contractors and households). Mainly the individual factors
determining the processes for risk management, innovation and edu-
cation and development at the organisation were examined in the
analysis.
A speciﬁc disruptive event scenario was deﬁned and then assessed
against the entity’s resilience (step 2). This event was “Disruption to
SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) system functioning
at the technical dispatch centre of a distribution system operator”. The
scenario was deﬁned using the Event Tree Analysis method (IEC, 2010).
A description of the disruptive event’s scenario is given in Fig. 6.
After completion of steps 1 and 2, the level of organisational resi-
lience of the critical infrastructure entity under assessment could be
determined (step 3). First, according to the analysis, organisational
resilience factors in the context of the above-mentioned disruptive
event were assessed. Based on pre-deﬁned parameters (e.g., Table 1 for
assessing the Level of Risk Management), the factor levels were assessed
by the security manager of the critical infrastructure entity. Each factor
was assigned a suitable number of points on a scale of 1–100, where 1
represented the minimum level of the parameter’s positive eﬀect in
creating resilience, and 100 represented the maximum positive eﬀect.
The assessment results are presented in Table 4 below.
Applying equation (1), the level of organisational resilience was
subsequently deﬁned. The resulting scores of organisational resilience
and determining processes are presented in Fig. 7.
The next step in assessing the organisational resilience and strength
was assessing the levels achieved and adoption of adequate solutions
(step 4). The values achieved were compared with an acceptance
grading scale of organisational resilience (see Table 3). The comparison
showed that the level of organisational resilience of the rated critical
infrastructure entity reached 53%, i.e., the lower limit of the lowest
level. The reason for such a low level is mainly because of poorly es-
tablished risk management processes, which, achieving just 24%, fall
into a critical level. Organisational innovation processes reached 64%,
which is also low. By contrast, educational and development processes
achieved 80%, which is an acceptable level and does not need any
immediate attention.
From this assessment, the weak points in the organisation’s risk
management and innovation processes were identiﬁed (step 5). The
results of the assessment of organisational resilience factors showed
that the entity’s critical organisational resilience factors are as follows:
- Level of risk management (32 points),
- Level of risk management methods applied (18 points),
- Level of safety standards implemented (36 points),
- Level of speciﬁcation of disruptive event scenarios (12 points),
- Flexibility of the organisational structure (10 points),
- Level of the organisation’s involvement in science and research (19
points).
The entity needs to revise these factors and commence recovery or
renewal processes (step 6). In terms of risk management, deﬁning the
risk management framework and principles, the strategic plan, the
implementation of risk management processes and the tasks and re-
sponsibilities in these processes (ISO, 2018) were highlighted as urgent
and proposed. In terms innovation, innovating in management pro-
cesses (ASIS, 2009), increasing the ﬂexibility of the entity’s organisa-
tional structure (Denyer, 2017) and involving the organisation in sci-
ence and research in energy infrastructure security (OECD/JRC, 2018)
were proposed.
After partially implementing the measures above, the organisational
resilience of the critical infrastructure entity was re-assessed. The re-
sults from re-assessment showed that organisational resilience in-
creased signiﬁcantly by 24%. Now achieving 77%, organisational re-
silience could be considered acceptable. Achieving this level of
resilience was limited by time and the entity’s current capabilities. For
this reason, further strengthening of organisational resilience up to a
high level may be assumed in the future.
In terms of risk management, a strategic basis (i.e. framework,
principles, strategic plan, responsibilities) was deﬁned as required. On
this basis, risk management processes could be implemented (focusing
on the risk assessment methodology, safety standards implementation,
and speciﬁcation of disruptive event scenarios). This process was ne-
cessary so that the entity’s organisational resilience could be increased
in the context of the disruptive event under assessment, i.e. “Disruption
to SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) system func-
tioning at the technical dispatch centre of a distribution system op-
erator”. As a result of these measures, the resilience of the process in-
creased by 55%.
In the case of innovation processes, innovating the management
processes was initiated (monitoring and self-assessment methods for the
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organisation were implemented). The entity was indirectly involved in
some projects dealing with security for electricity infrastructure
(mainly in practical veriﬁcation of the project’s results and feedback to
the author). Increasing the organisational resilience in entities of this
type was impossible. Process resilience increased by 7% as a result of
these measures.
It follows from the case study above that organisational resilience in
critical infrastructure entities is an important part of security for critical
infrastructure elements. For example, Bruneau et al. (2003), even in
2003, identiﬁed organisational resilience as a key dimension of infra-
structure (and then also community) resilience. This is because the
importance of organisational resilience consists in strengthening an
organisation’s ability to absorb and adapt in a changing environment
(ISO, 2017) or surviving and strengthening in times of crisis (Seville
et al., 2008; Gonçalves et al., 2019). This creates a resilient environ-
ment for strengthening the technical resilience of critical infrastructure
elements. Consequently, the impact of disruption to or failure of
elements dependent on critical infrastructure (such as information and
communications technology or transport infrastructure) is minimised.
Real world examples demonstrating the need for a high level of orga-
nisational resilience in the electricity sector are nuclear facilities (dis-
asters at Chernobyl, 1986, Fukushima, 2011). Cyber-attacks on power
systems (Mullane, 2019) also pose a threat to nuclear power stations
(Iran, 2010), power distribution systems (Ukraine, 2015) and opera-
tions technologies (Saudi Arabia, 2017).
5. Conclusion
The paper presents a method for assessing and strengthening orga-
nisational resilience in a critical infrastructure system (ASOR Method).
The method enables weaknesses to be identiﬁed and the subsequent
quantiﬁcation of positive impacts that strengthen individual organisa-
tional resilience factors. This method is especially intended for the se-
curity managers of critical infrastructure entities who conduct
Fig. 6. Description of the disruptive event scenario.
Table 4
Results of the organisational resilience factor assessment.
Organisational resilience processes Organisational resilience factors Number of points
Risk management Level of risk management 32
Level of risk assessment methods applied 18
Level of safety standards implemented 36
Level of speciﬁcation of disruptive event scenarios 12
Organisational innovation processes Flexibility of the organisational structure 10
Level of management systems implemented 73
Methods of organisational process management 57
Level of innovation in management processes 38
Scope of technological innovations implemented 82
Level of innovation in security measures 91
Level of the organisation’s involvement in science and research 19
Level of the organisation’s investment into speciﬁc innovations 95
Educational and development processes Level of education provided or supported to the organisation’s employees 90
Level of employee training and maintenance of practical skills 76
Method of evaluating the eﬀectiveness of employee training 69
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assessment procedures in cooperation with managers responsible for
individual organisational processes. The method is applicable to any
critical infrastructure entity and enables organisational resilience to be
assessed and strengthened against any disruptive event. Currently, the
ASOR Method has already been successfully applied by several critical
infrastructure entities in the Czech Republic (e.g. Transmission System
Operator of the Czech Republic, Czech Railway Infrastructure
Administration, and Regional Hospital Ostrava) and Slovakia (e.g.
Central Slovak Power Distribution Company and Railways of the Slovak
Republic).
Besides describing the ASOR method, the article also presented an
example of the method’s practical application in a selected critical in-
frastructure entity in the energy sector. The assessment results showed
a critical level in organisational resilience, particularly in risk man-
agement concerning cyber threats. Because of SCADA’s high vulner-
ability, disruption to its system may occur and result in huge power
outages or blackouts (such as in 2012 when the Shamoon virus disabled
tens of thousands of computers at middle-eastern energy companies). A
critical level in organisational resilience in some innovation processes
resulting in inﬂexibility in managing security systems, innovation and
risk management was also identiﬁed.
In conclusion, it is worth noting that high quality and eﬀective
management of organisational resilience is the starting point and an
integral part of eﬀectively strengthening technical resilience elements
already during their planning and construction stages. Strengthening
complex resilience elements in a critical infrastructure system depends
on an organisation’s level of management and the availability of ne-
cessary resources. However, in a broader context, resilience should be
seen as an indispensable part of risk management that signiﬁcantly
contributes to minimizing the risk of critical infrastructure system dis-
ruption or failure and the subsequent adverse impact on society.
Acknowledgments
This work was supported by the Ministry of the Interior of the Czech
Republic, [Grant No. VI20152019049: Dynamic Resilience Evaluation
of Interrelated Critical Infrastructure Subsystems].
Declarations of interest
No potential conﬂict of interest was reported by the author.
References
Armstrong, M., 2014. Armstrong's Handbook of Human Resource Management Practice.
Kogan Page, London, United Kingdom.
ASIS. 2009. The Organizational Resilience Standard [ASIS SPC.1-2009]. American
National Standards Institute, Washington, DC.
Bertocchi, G., Bologna, S., Carducci, G., Carrozzi, L., Cavallini, A., Lazari, A., Oliva, G.,
Traballesi, A., 2016. Guidelines for Critical Infrastructure Resilience Evaluation.
Italian Association of Critical Infrastructures’ Experts, Roma, Italy.
Boylan, S.A., Turner, K.A., 2017. Developing organizational adaptability for complex
environment. J. Leadership Educ. 16 (2), 183–198. https://doi.org/10.12806/V16/
I2/T2.
Bruneau, M., Chang, S.E., Eguchi, R.T., Lee, G.C., O’Rourke, T.D., Reinhorn, A.M.,
Shinozuka, M., Tierney, K., Wallace, W.A., Von Winterfeldt, D., 2003. A framework to
quantitatively assess and enhance the seismic resilience of communities. Earthquake
Spectra 19 (4), 733–752. https://doi.org/10.1193/1.1623497.
Bryson, J.M., 2004. What to do when stakeholders matter: a guide to stakeholder iden-
tiﬁcation and analysis techniques. Public Manage. Rev. 6 (1), 21–53.
De La Canal, M.D., Ferraris, I.C., 2013. Risk analysis holistic approach as a base for de-
cision making under uncertainties. Chem. Eng. Trans. 33, 193–198. https://doi.org/
10.3330/CET1333033.
Denyer, D., 2017. Organizational Resilience: A summary of academic evidence, business
insights and new thinking. BSI and Cranﬁeld School of Management, Cranﬁeld,
United Kingdom.
Djapan, M., Tadic, D., Macuric, I., Jerenic, B., Giaglon, E., 2013. A new model for eva-
luation of safety grade of indicators based on fuzzy logic. Chem. Eng. Trans. 33,
463–468. https://doi.org/10.3303/CET1333078.
European Council, 2008. Council Directive 2008/114/EC of 8 December 2008 on the
identiﬁcation and designation of European critical infrastructures and the assessment
of the need to improve their protection. European Union, Brussels, Belgium.
Gonçalves, L., Navarro, J.B., Sala, R., 2019. Spanish validation of the Benchmark
Resilience Tool (short-form version) to evaluate organisational resilience. Saf. Sci.
111, 94–101. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2018.09.015.
Grabinski, M., 2007. Management Methods and Tools. Springer Gabler, Wiesbaden,
Germany. DOI: 10.1007/978-3-8349-9295-6.
IEC 60812, 2006a. Analysis techniques for system reliability – Procedure for failure mode
and eﬀects analysis (FMEA). International Electrotechnical Commission, Geneva,
Switzerland.
IEC 62502, 2010. Analysis techniques for dependability – Event tree analysis (ETA).
International Electrotechnical Commission, Geneva, Switzerland.
IEC 61025. 2006b. Fault Tree Analysis (FTA). International Electrotechnical Commission,
Geneva, Switzerland.
ISO 22316, 2017. Security and resilience – Organizational resilience – Principles and
attributes. International Organization for Standardization, Geneva, Switzerland.
ISO 31000, 2018. Risk management – Guidelines. International Organization for
Standardization, Geneva, Switzerland.
Kalowski, A., 2015. Structure determining factors of business organization. Int. J.
Innovat., Manage. Technol. 6 (3), 206–212. https://doi.org/10.7763/IJIMT.2015.V6.
603.
Labaka, L., Hernantes, J., Sarriegi, J.M., 2015. A framework to improve the resilience of
critical infrastructures. Int. J. Disaster Resil. Built Environ. 6 (4), 409–423. https://
doi.org/10.1108/IJDRBE-07-2014-0048.
McManus, S.T., Seville, E., Vargo, J., Brunsdon, D., 2008. Facilitated process for im-
proving organizational resilience. Nat. Hazard. Rev. 9 (2), 81–90. https://doi.org/10.
1061/(ASCE)1527-6988(2008) 9:2(81).
Mullane, M.A., 2019. Cyber attacks targeting critical infrastructure.< https://iecetech.
org/index.php/Technology-Focus/2019-02/Cyber-attacks-targeting-critical-
Fig. 7. Resulting organisational resilience level of the critical infrastructure entity.
D. Rehak Safety Science 123 (2020) 104573
8
infrastructure> (Feb. 1, 2019).
Nan, C., Sansavini, G., 2017. A quantitative Method for Assessing Resilience of
Interdependent Infrastructures. Reliab. Eng. Syst. Saf. 157, 35–53. https://doi.org/
10.1016/j.ress.2016.08.013.
Nasibova, R.A., Nasibov, E.N., 2010. Linear aggregation with weighted ranking. Autom.
Control Comput. Sci. 44 (2), 96. https://doi.org/10.3103/S0146411610020057.
NIAC (National Infrastructure Advisory Council), 2009. Critical Infrastructure Resilience:
Final Report and Recommendations. U.S. Department of Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
OECD/Eurostat (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development), 2005. Oslo
Manual: Guidelines for Collecting and Interpreting Innovation Data. OECD
Publishing, Paris, France. DOI: 10.1787/9789264013100-en.
OECD/JRC, 2018. System thinking for critical infrastructure resilience and security
(Workshop). Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/Joint
Research Centre, Paris, France/ Brussels, Belgium.< http://www.oecd.org/gov/
risk/workshop-oecd-jrc-system-thinking-for-critical-infrastructure-resilience-and-
security.htm> (Aug. 22, 2019).
Petit, F., Bassett, G., Black, R., Buehring, W., Collins, M., Dickinson, D., Fisher, R.,
Haﬀenden, R., Huttenga, A., Klett, M., Phillips, J., Thomas, M., Veselka, S., Wallace,
K., Whitﬁeld, R., Peerenboom, J., 2013. Resilience Measurement Index: An Indicator
of Critical Infrastructure Resilience. Argonne National Laboratory, Chicago, IL.
Prior, T., 2015. Measuring Critical Infrastructure Resilience: Possible Indicators (Risk and
Resilience Report 9). Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule Zürich, Zurich,
Switzerland.
Public Safety Canada, 2018. National Cross Sector Forum 2018–2020 Action Plan for
Critical Infrastructure. Public Safety Canada, Ottawa, Canada.
Rehak, D., Hromada, M., Ristvej, J., 2017. Indication of Critical Infrastructure Resilience
Failure. In: Cepin, M., Bris, R. (Eds.), Safety and Reliability – Theory and Application
(ESREL). Taylor & Francis Group, London, United Kingdom, pp. 963–970.
Rehak, D., Senovsky, P., 2014. Preference risk assessment of electric power critical in-
frastructure. Chem. Eng. Trans. 36, 469–474. https://doi.org/10.3303/CET1436079.
Rehak, D., Senovsky, P., Slivkova, S., 2018. Resilience of critical infrastructure elements
and its main factors. Systems 6 (2), 21. https://doi.org/10.3390/systems6020021.
Rehak, D., Senovsky, P., Hromada, M., Lovecek, T., 2019. Complex approach to assessing
resilience of critical infrastructure elements. Int. J. Crit. Infrastruct. Prot. 25,
125–138. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijcip.2019.03.003.
Saaty, T.L., 2004. Fundamentals of the analytic network process — multiple networks
with beneﬁts, costs, opportunities and risks. J. Syst. Sci. Syst. Eng. 13 (3), 348–379.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11518-006-0171-1.
Saaty, T.L., 2008. Decision making with the analytic hierarchy process. Int. J. Serv. Sci. 1
(1), 83–98. https://doi.org/10.1504/IJSSci. 2008.01759.
Seville, E., Brunsdon, D., Dantas, A., Le Masurier, J., Wilkinson, S., Vargo, J., 2008.
Organisational resilience: researching the reality of New Zealand organisations. J.
Bus. Contin. Emerg. Plan. 2 (2), 258–266.
Tasic, J., Amir, S., Tan, J., Khader, M., 2019. A multilevel framework to enhance orga-
nizational resilience. J. Risk Res. https://doi.org/10.1080/13669877.2019.1617340.
Weil, R., Apostolakis, G.E., 2001. A methodology for the prioritization of operating ex-
perience in nuclear power plants. Reliab. Eng. Syst. Saf. 74 (1), 23–42. https://doi.
org/10.1016/S0951-8320(01)00064-3.
D. Rehak Safety Science 123 (2020) 104573
9
